Wireless, War and Intelligence
during the Irish War of Independence
© The Irish Broadcasting Hall of Fame
Imagine a battlefield where the most valuable
weapon is invisible. No rifle shot, no explosion, no military column—just a
faint signal travelling silently through the air. In Ireland between 1919 and
1921, that invisible weapon was wireless. As the British authorities struggled
to maintain communications across a country where telephone and telegraph lines
were routinely cut, Sinn Féin and the Volunteers began to recognise that
whoever could listen, intercept, disrupt or exploit the new technology might
gain a crucial advantage. Wireless was still in its infancy, yet in the middle
of Ireland's guerrilla war it had already become something more than a means of
communication: it was becoming a weapon in the battle for information.
On June 15th, 1920, Dame Nellie Melba sang into a
microphone at Chelmsford. This was radio broadcasting as we know it today:
entertainment transmitted by wireless. Across the Irish Sea, however, wireless
was being used for a completely different purpose: war. During the Irish War of
Independence, wireless technology became part of an evolving struggle over
communication, intelligence and military control. While neither side was able
to exploit its full potential, the technology increasingly influenced how the
British authorities attempted to communicate with their forces and how Sinn Féin
and the Volunteers sought to intercept, disrupt and exploit those
communications.
In 1916, the Easter rebels used their ingenuity,
knowledge and tactical awareness to repair a closed wireless school, and
Ireland became the first nation in the world to be declared by wireless. The
rebels circumvented the strict Defence of the Realm Act (DORA), which attempted
to censor and control the airwaves during the midst of the First World War. The
war ended on November 11th, 1918, but within two months the first shots of the
Irish War of Independence were fired. The British authorities, with the military
taking the lead, attempted to maintain strict control over the new
communication medium. While wireless would not have a significant impact on the
guerrilla-style war, it did exercise military planners on both sides.
On February 1st, 1919, the police raided a Sinn
Féin hall on Clonliffe Road, and twelve of the forty men present found
themselves before the courts. The Freeman’s Journal reported that,
when questioned, Inspector O’Flaherty stated:
‘The Inspector said they
found an old bayonet and some singlesticks. A small wooden model, apparently of
wireless apparatus, was also produced, and Mr O'Flaherty said it was a model
from which a lot could be learned.’
Throughout the war, both sides would experiment
with the use of wireless, and both would encounter problems that limited its
effectiveness. In February 1919, British newspapers reported on ‘Sinn Fein
Wireless’, their communications system. The Empire News reported:
‘I hear a curious tale of the Sinn Fein method of
disseminating instructions and news. The system was traced to the so called
‘creameries. Whence information and messages were carried and disseminated by
every market cart.’
As the war intensified throughout 1919, the Volunteers attempted to curtail the British military and police's ability to call out reinforcements or direct raids by cutting telephone and telegraph lines. The intelligence services of Sinn Féin included sympathisers in local post offices, in telephone exchanges and in the communications department of Dublin Castle. Michael Collins always believed that safest and most effective way of communication through a highly sophisticated network of human couriers and physical written despatches rather than radio transmissions. But nevertheless, wireless was a weapon of war that either needed to be harnessed or disrupted.
Towards the end of 1919, the British were relying
increasingly on wireless communications. This method linked rural RIC barracks
with major troop concentrations. Even the fledgling RAF was using one-way
communications from surveillance aircraft to the ground. The aircraft were not
capable of two-way communication. One of the problems that the Volunteers would
have encountered was coded messages. This had been developed on the
battlefields of the First World War, with the British attempting to prevent the
Germans from understanding intercepted messages. For an observer in an
aircraft, it would have been difficult, with little time and cramped facilities
on board, to properly send coded messages and for someone on the ground to
decode them. These delays would have made it almost impossible to send patrols
quickly to an identified area. First World War military wireless technology
transitioned from bulky, primitive spark-gap telegraphy into the foundation of
modern two-way voice and radio communication, and this is what was to be
deployed in Ireland.
By January 1920, the decision was made to furnish
as many RIC county headquarters as possible with wireless telegraphy.
Complaints were coming from the field. One correspondent wrote:
“I am stationed in a very
special centre and on several Sundays, I’ve seen Special men[1] complain that
they cannot get in touch with Dublin Castle though they have very important
messages to transmit, Post Offices are closed on those days and consequently
telegrams could not be sent.[2]”
In March, the Daily Mail reported that:
‘owing to the frequency
with which telephone and telegraph wires are cut in Ireland, the Government
authorities have decided to make extensive use of the wireless telephone there.
Operators are drawn from the signal section of the navy which explains the
frequent arrival in Ireland of the sailors with mysterious appliances in their
bags.’[3]
Throughout May, newspapers widely reported the
installation of wireless telegraphy stations in Kerry. On May 1st, wireless
communications were established between the military and police barracks in
Tralee and other barracks in the county. On May 15th, the Freeman’s Journal
reported that naval wireless mechanics had installed a wireless apparatus in
Listowel.
An advertisement in the Birmingham Evening
Dispatch on May 21st, 1920, indicates the rapid advancement of wireless
communications in Ireland as the War of Independence continued. The
authorities, while seeking ‘wireless operators and wireless electricians,
fitters and instrument makers’, singled out discharged naval men, as many would
already have completed their wireless proficiency while serving at sea. The
headline stated:
‘£100 Army Bounties For
Wireless Operators and £50 Bounties For Wireless Electricians, Fitters and
Instrument Makers.’[4]
On June 20th, a newspaper report highlighted the
difficulties facing the British authorities:
‘In official Irish circles
it is now admitted that the situation in Ireland is not improving but rather
getting worse. Sir Hamar Greenwood and Sir Nevil Macready have been back in
London without any fresh grounds for the hope that the end of the outrages is
as yet in sight.
One of the main
difficulties experienced by the Irish Government turns upon the communication
of local news and an efficient system of intelligence. From the earliest stages
of the trouble Sinn Fein has beaten the Government hollow in that particular.
People who are not supporters of Sinn Fein are intimidated.
The enemy knows
everything, and the Irish Government knows next to nothing. Telephone and telegraph
wires can easily be cut down, but wireless cannot be so treated. The wireless
installations in Ireland are wholly inadequate to cover the distances as
required. A large expenditure upon wireless communication has become a
necessity of the situation.
Steps will now be taken to
get the wireless service made efficient as a means by which the military and
police may have an improved chance of anticipating attacks upon buildings which
the enemy has marked for destruction.’
These newspaper reports were having the desired
effect on the Intelligence Department of Sinn Féin. When the Volunteers were
raiding RIC barracks or the premises of sympathisers, they not only sought guns
and ammunition to commandeer, but also attempted to seize wireless sets. Where
the equipment could not be removed, it was destroyed beyond further use.
A raid on Kilbrittain RIC barracks was described by
Michael Crowley in his Bureau of Military History Witness Statement:
‘This success netted us
fifteen rifles and approximately 10,000 rounds of .303. Before leaving, we
dismantled and removed wireless transmitter. The disarmed Marines were soon
evacuated, and the building was subsequently burned by the local Volunteers. The
wireless transmitter was set up with technical assistance of post office
linesmen from, I think, Bandon, to the best of my recollection. Some messages
between the R.I.C. barracks were intercepted, but the quickening tempo of
operations in the area made it difficult effectively to operate without
detection.’
Further witness statements provide an insight into
how Sinn Féin and the Volunteers viewed wireless technology. Patrick McKenna
from Ardfert, Kerry, stated:
“About the end of the
year, Paddy Cahill, Brigade O/C, asked me if I knew of anyone in the area who
understood wireless telegraphy. It so happened that a man named John Joe
Sullivan, a wireless operator on one of the British Merchant ships, was home on
leave at the time. Cahill suggested that we should ask his assistance in
erecting a wireless station in our area, out of wireless equipment at
Ballymacquinn wireless station which was not being used at the time. I
contacted O'Sullivan and, with the help of the local Volunteers, dismantled and
removed some of the equipment at Ballymacquinn. When it was examined and tested
by the Brigade Engineer, it was found to be useless for our purpose. O'Sullivan
later joined the Volunteers and did not rejoin his ship.”
Meanwhile, Liam Archer stated:
“Towards the end of 1920,
or else early in 1921, we procured a British Aircraft W & T receiver and
set up a listening station in a house in Nelson Street. We engaged full time on
this a trained wireless operator - Delargy - but I do not recollect that we
secured any tangible results. Later we secured a transmitter and receiver which
we took one day to R. Barton’s in Wicklow and experimented with it, but again I
recollect no tangible results.”
In early 1920, the British authorities believed
they could circumvent the stalling tactics created by the Volunteers' cutting
of telegraph lines by using wireless telegraphy. But just as battlefield
tactics evolve to counter an opponent, Sinn Féin not only built crude wireless
receivers to intercept messages but also stole wireless sets from the military
and used them in an attempt to stay one step ahead of the enemy.
This was apparent when messages being sent from
spotter RAF aircraft back to base were reportedly intercepted, allowing
Volunteers to abandon positions and melt back into the countryside before
military trucks arrived.
‘The mails and telegraph
services are in the hands of Sinn Fein. Not only are mails at the stations
regularly raided, trains and mail-carts held up, but Sinn Fein have their
agents in the telegraph offices, who transmit to Sinn Fein agents all telegrams
connected with official and military business. Some of these agents are known.
When discovered they are not dismissed the Service but moved to another place
where they cannot do much harm.
At Limerick station I saw
baskets of homing pigeons being placed in the train under military escort. On
inquiry I was told that these were for out-lying military stations to
communicate with headquarters.
Listowel police barracks
have been fitted with wireless, but Sinn Fein have also their wireless
stations, and recently the destroyers lying in Kenmare River have been picking
up Bolshevist messages from Sinn Fein, urging the crews to throw their capitalist
officers overboard.
The Sinn Fein intelligence
service is wonderfully complete. Their spies and agents are everywhere. There
seems little doubt that Inspector Redmond was murdered as the result of a
traitor in the Dublin police. The fact that certain arrests were carried out
successfully when ordered by the military authorities could only be due to the
fact that the “wanted persons” were warned in time, and when their houses were
raided, they were gone.’[5]
The battle over the wireless airwaves continued
unabated. Rural wireless continued to be rolled out, with local newspapers
reporting that stations in County Limerick, including Abbeyfeale, were having
wireless telegraphy installed.[6]
The authorities did have some success in hitting
back in the wireless war. In August 1920, it was reported that James Merne,
described as a technical instructor from Drumsna, County Leitrim, was arrested
when police and military raided his house and seized a complete wireless
installation.
The Daily Express in London reported on
July 9th:
‘a small portable wireless
has been carried about by numerous Sinn Fein secret service agents. It is
chiefly employed in intercepting military wireless messages from station to
station and was used during a recent search by Royal Air Force pilots and observers.’
The Daily Mail reported:
‘The National Telephone [7]
premises at Cork have been raided. Several sets of wireless and telephonic
instruments were taken away. Wireless is playing a prominent part in the Sinn
Feiners’ campaign. They are manufacturing portable sets in the hundreds. This
accounts for the rapid concentration of men in unexpected places and Sinn
Fein’s knowledge of the movement of troops. A portable set is easily carried
and does not demand great electrical energy[8]. It is quite satisfactory for
distances of 20 or 30 miles, and the collapsible aerial which Sinn Fein is
employing can be quickly set up and as quickly taken down. The source of the
messages can of course be traced but when the military appear on scene, the
birds have flown.’
In October, the Kerryman newspaper
reported that the wireless station at Cahirsiveen was raided and ‘valuable
wireless and telegraphic instruments’ were taken.
By the end of 1920, neither side had been able to
take full advantage of wireless. While the Irish Volunteers had an extensive
network of informers, spies, messengers and sympathisers, the British
authorities were increasingly unable to rely on telephone or telegraph
communications. Wireless also proved problematic, whether because of the
destruction or seizure of sets, difficulties in operating equipment, or the
interception of messages.
Much of the scaremongering about the failures and
defects of wireless telegraphy on the battlefield came from the British press.
The British military had expanded and developed the use of Marconi’s invention
on the battlefields of France during the First World War. In the newly
developed guerrilla warfare employed by Sinn Féin and the Volunteers, however,
the British authorities sought explanations for their difficulties, and
wireless was one of the factors identified.
To provide balance to the British press point of
view, the Irish Independent, in a piece titled ‘What Is The Object?’,
wrote:
‘For the past month or so,
curious little paragraphs have been appearing in London newspapers about the
success of the Irish Volunteers in tapping wireless communications sent from
military commands in this country. One report stated that the Volunteers had
small wireless apparatus with receiving radius of five miles, by --which they
“read” messages sent from aeroplanes sent out to search for General Lucas. A
later paragraph told the arrival of carrier pigeons at Dublin Castle to keep up
military communications in this country. A still later item mentioned the
discovery somewhere in the West of Ireland of what the military believed to be
a complete wireless installation, and the latest is to the effect that the
wireless apparatus in the hands of the Volunteers was captured from the
military, and must be operated by ex-service men, who had experience of it at
the front.
Now, whoever is
responsible for the giving out of all this gratuitous information must have no
very exalted opinion of the intelligence of the British public, for whose
consumption it is intended. If the Volunteers are in possession of the handy
five-mile-radius apparatus they are the last people in the world to give the
show away. The surmise of the military who were trying to locate General Lucas,
that their messages were “read” lacks confirmation from the only persons who
can give it. We fancy most of the military messages are sent in code, so that
more than a receiving set would be required to tap them.
But if the Volunteers are
in possession of wireless apparatus, where is the occasion for surprise,
considering that loyal British firms are prepared to supply anyone with
wireless sets for a few pounds. One has only to take up any of the
semi-scientific periodicals to find offers of everything required for wireless
telegraphy, and there is no stipulation made as to the nationality or “loyalty”
of the purchaser. English electric apparatus makers appear just as willing to
trade with any customer as were Birmingham traders to supply guns in the good
old days.’
In July 1921, shortly before the declaration of the
Truce, the Daily Mirror reported on a raid in Tralee where a ‘Sinn
Fein Wireless was Seized’, along with signalling flags, revolvers, ammunition
and gelignite.
Conclusion
Wireless communication occupied an important, if
often overlooked, position within the technological history of the Irish War of
Independence. The evidence demonstrates that its significance lay less in
transforming the conflict into a technologically driven war than in becoming
another contested means of communication, intelligence gathering and counter-intelligence.
The British authorities increasingly recognised wireless as a potential
solution to the vulnerability of telephone and telegraph networks, particularly
as lines were repeatedly cut and local communications were disrupted. At the
same time, Sinn Féin and the Volunteers sought to exploit the same technology
through interception, acquisition and experimentation.
Contemporary newspaper reports frequently presented
wireless in dramatic terms, sometimes attributing considerable effectiveness to
Sinn Féin's interception capabilities. However, the surviving witness
statements suggest a more complicated reality. Volunteers encountered technical
difficulties, unreliable equipment and a shortage of suitably trained
operators. British installations faced similar problems, while the mobile and
clandestine nature of guerrilla warfare limited the practical value of fixed
communications infrastructure. Wireless therefore became part of a wider
intelligence system that also incorporated sympathetic officials, postal and
telephone workers, couriers, informers and traditional methods of
communication.
The history of wireless during the conflict
consequently illustrates an important transitional moment in Irish
communications history: new technology was being introduced into an old
struggle for information, but its effectiveness remained dependent upon people,
infrastructure, technical knowledge and the circumstances in which it was
deployed.
© The Irish Broadcasting Hall of Fame
[1] Special Branch, plain-clothes detectives.
[2] A letter signed ‘Aerial’ and published in the Constabulary
Gazette, January 31st, 1920.
[3] Edinburgh Evening Dispatch, March
29th, 1920.
[4] Evening Daily Dispatch, May 21st,
1920.
[5] Roscommon Herald, June 19th, 1920.
[6] July 10th, 1920.
[7] The National Telephone Company was formed in
1893, replacing the Telephone Company of Ireland.
[8] Most wireless transmitting sets, especially
portable sets, required battery power rather than mains electricity.
Sources
The
Bureau of Military History
The
World Radio Online Archive
The
US Library of Congress Newspaper Archive
The
Irish Newspaper Archives
The
British Newspaper Archives
The
National Library of Ireland
The
National Archives of Ireland
The
National Archives Kew Gardens
